








THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EUROPE: 


















This paper discusses the impact of the completion of the 
EC internal market on the competitive position of EFTA 
firms (and, hence, also on economic growth in EFTA 
countries). The discussion falls in three parts. First, 
the process of European economic integration in the last 
decades - as reflected in the composition of EC imports - 
is examined. Then follows a discussion of the likely 
effects of the internal market, and to what extent these 
should be expected to deviate much from what can be 
observed from European economic integration in the past. 
Finally, the special problems and opportunities of EFTA 
firms - as firms from small countries with small domestic 
markets - are considered. The conclusion is that EFTA 
firms are in a good position to exploit the possibilities 
offered by the current deregulation efforts and opening 
up of markets implied by the EC internal market plans. 
                     
1  The calculations presented in the paper are part of a 
current research project supported by the Nordic Economic 
Research Council. An earlier version of the paper was 
presented at the seminar THE EC INTERNAL MARKET AND THE 
NORDIC COUNTRIES at Lovik, Lidingø, June 11-13, 1990. I 
want to thank Arne Melchior, NUPI and the participants of 
the seminar for comments and suggestions for improvements, 




1.  Introduction 
 
The EC plans for the internal market have significantly 
influenced the political agenda in the six EFTA 
countries. The fear that EFTA firms, and consequently the 
EFTA countries, are not going to share the economic gains 
implied by the internal market is widespread. To avoid 
this outcome, many observers now argue that new 
institutional arrangements between the EC and the EFTA 
(or its member countries) are called for. 
 
However, to what extent should the completion of the 
internal market be conceived as a threat by EFTA firms? 
This is the question addressed in this paper. In doing 
so, both the special interpretation of history used in 
support of the internal market (the European malaise: 
Eurosclerosis), and the analyses brought forward by the 
Commission on the likely effects of the actions to be 
undertaken (the European cure: the internal market), are 
examined. The focus of the paper is on manufacturing 
industry. Other aspects, such as labour market 
integration, financial integration and fiscal 
harmonization, though equally or perhaps even more 
important, are not considered.  
 
The discussion falls in three parts. The first examines 
the process of European economic integration in the 1970s 
and 1980s as reflected in the country composition of EC 
imports. Then follows a discussion of to what extent the 
effects of the internal market should be expected deviate 
much from those which can be observed from the process of 
European economic integration in the past. Finally, the 
paper considers the special problems and opportunities 




process of increasing international economic integration, 
with particular emphasis on the EFTA countries.  
 
Figure 1. Intra-regional trade, six EC countries, in per 
cent of total imports (excl. oil and gas) 
 
 
2.  European integration in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
The process of European economic integration in the last 
decades can be divided in two phases (Jacquemin and 
Sapir, 1988). The first phase starts around 1960 with the 
formation of EC and EFTA and ends with the first 
enlargement of the EC in the early 1970s. In this phase, 
intra-EC trade grew much faster than total EC trade, 
causing the share of intra-EC trade as a percentage of 
total EC imports to rise significantly (figure 1). The 
second phase dates from the early 1970s onwards. What 
characterizes this phase, compared to the preceding one, 




than total EC trade. In fact, as shown in figure 1, in 
the case of the six initial EC-countries, their internal 
trade as a share of their total foreign trade has 
actually declined. 
 
The share of intra-regional trade in total trade is a 
commonly used indicator of economic integration. No 
surprise, then, that the figures referred to above have 
caused some worry in EC circles. One widely shared 
interpretation of these developments is that they reflect 
so-called "Eurosclerosis", a shorthand for various 
institutional obstacles to trade and growth that are 
assumed to be especially evident in EC countries. 
According to this view, these obstacles have hampered the 
competitiveness of EC firms and caused their market 
shares, especially for high technology products, to 
decrease in favour of their allegedly more dynamic 
competitors from the USA and Japan.  
 
In the following we will discuss some of the reasons for 
the changes that can be recorded in the country 
composition of EC imports in the last decades. Table 1 
gives a summary of these developments for all goods 
excluding oil and gas. In contrast to figure 1, the table 
covers the imports of both the six initial EC member 
countries and the three EFTA countries that joined the EC 





Table 1.  Shares of EC imports, 1961-1987, All goods 
(excl. oil and gas) 
                  Change 
 
       1961    1973  1987   61-73  73-87 
 
 
(1) EC6     31.93  48.44  48.63  +16.51   +0.19 
 
(2) EC3     8.08   7.03   8.70  - 1.05   +1.67 
 
Sum 1-2 EC9 40.01  55.47  57.33  +15.46   +1.86 
 
(3) EFTA6   10.39   9.31  10.18  - 1.08   +0.87 
 
(4) South-Europe  
       2.33   2.71   4.37  + 0.38   +1.66 
 
Sum 1-4 Europe  
            52.73  67.49  71.88  +14.76   +4.39 
 
(5) Japan    0.78   2.19   4.89  + 1.41   +2.70 
 
(6) NIC      2.19   3.51   4.73  + 1.32   +1.22 
 
(7) USA/Canada  
            15.80  11.05   8.35  - 4.75   -2.70 
 
(8) Rest    28.50  15.76  10.15  -12.74   -5.61 
 





EC6: Be-Ne-Lux, BRD, France, Italy 
EC3: Ireland, Denmark, UK. 
EFTA6: Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Austria, 
Switzerland. 
Southern Europe: Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey. 
NIC: Yougoslavia, Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, Korea 
(South), Taiwan, Hong Kong. 
 
Source: OECD Trade Series C, IKE Database on Foreign 




It is easily seen that this gives a somewhat different 
picture than the one presented in figure 1. In fact, when 
care is taken to the effects of the enlargement of the EC 
in the early 1970s, the six initial EC countries' share 
of total EC imports does not decline. Following the 
enlargement of the Community, the six initial EC 
countries increased their exports to the three new member 
countries, thus offsetting the slow growth in their 
mutual trade. Furthermore, as should be expected, the 
three new member countries also increased their trade 
with the six initial member countries, causing intra-EC 
trade as a share of total EC imports (so defined) to 
increase by some 2 percentage points between 1973 and 
1987. However, as can be seen from table 1, also the six 
EFTA countries and the countries of Southern Europe
2 
increased their shares of total EC imports in this 
period. Thus, even though the share of the six initial EC 
countries did not increase, it was a significant increase 
in the share of Western Europe in EC trade during this 
period. Taking a long view, what these data show is 
primarily the strong increase in European economic 
integration from the 1960s onwards. However, while 
economic integration in the 1960s was mainly carried out 
within two competing trade blocks, EC and EFTA, European 
integration in the 1970s and 1980s has resulted in an 
"European economic space" in which present day EC and 
present day EFTA countries are integrated more or less to 
the same extent.
3  
                     
2 Three of the four Southern European countries, included 
in this table later joined the EC, but with the exception 
of Greece, which is numerically less important, this was 
done so late that it can hardly have had any important 
impact on the data for 1987. 
3 Both present day EFTA and present day EC countries have 




With regard to the non European countries, also Japan and 
the NICs recorded increases in their shares of total EC 
imports during the 1970s and 1980s, while both the USA 
and Canada and the rest of the world (mostly developing) 
lost. Thus, there is certainly no evidence, at this level 
of aggregation at least, for the view that the European 
countries have lost in relation to the USA. The gains for 
Japan and the NIC countries were large in relative terms 
and show the increasing competitiveness of these 
countries on world markets in this period. However, the 
combined share of Japan and the NICs in EC imports in 
1987 remained rather low, below 10%.  
 
The picture presented in table 1. is of course a highly 
aggregated one. To see what hides behind the aggregate, 
we have repeated the calculation for four sub-sectors: 
Products based on natural resources, chemicals, 
machinery- and transport equipment and traditional 
manufactures. The relevant tables are included in an 
appendix to this paper, here we will just point out some 
main tendencies. The strongest growth in the Western 
European share of EC imports is found for products based 
on natural resources. Approximately one half of this 
increase was due to increased shares for the six initial 
EC countries, to some extent a reflection of the highly 
protectionist agricultural policy followed by the EC in 
this period. In the three other sectors, however, the 
share of the six initial EC countries in total EC imports 
declined, most markedly for machinery and transport and 
traditional manufactures. In chemicals, the gains 
recorded by the new EC members, present day EFTA and the 
                     







South European countries were sufficient to secure an 
increase in the total Western European share of EC 
imports, at the expense of the USA and Canada. Although 
Western Europe less the six initial EC members also 
increased its total share of EC imports for machinery and 
transport equipment and traditional manufactures, this 
increase was not sufficient to prevent a decline in the 
total Western European share of EC imports for these 
goods. For machinery and transport equipment, the most 
sizable gains were made by Japan followed by the NICs, 
while the share of the USA and Canada declined. For 
traditional manufactures the largest gains were made by 
the developing countries ("the rest") followed by the 
South European countries and the NICs. This suggests that 
the decline in the Western European share of total EC 
imports of manufactures in this period to a considerable 
extent is a reflection of the process of 
industrialization and "catching up" in NIC countries and 
other third world countries in the last decades. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is a widely held view that 
producers in the Community have lost ground relative to 
producers from the United States, especially in high 
technology products. However, there is little in the 
evidence considered so far that supports this view. 
Indeed, USA/Canada have lost market shares in all sectors 
considered so far. To be able to discuss this issue in 
more detail, we have in table 2 listed all goods where 
the six initial EC countries according to our 
calculations have lost more than 10% of the EC 
market(imports) between 1973 and 1987. It is true that 
some of these goods are so-called high technology goods, 
i.e. goods stemming from industries with a high R&D 
intensity in production. However, as should be clear from 




than the six initial EC countries for these goods. 
Furthermore, Western Europe as a whole is doing it a lot 
better than both the six initial EC countries and 
USA/Canada. Thus, there does not seem to be any evidence 
supporting the view that US producers are doing it 
markedly better than producers from the EC or Western 
Europe as a whole.
4 Rather, it seems that the developed 

















                     
4 The evidence considered here covers EC imports only. 
Buiges and Goybet (1989) present penetration rates for 
imports to the USA, the EC(7) and Japan, and market shares 
for the USA, the EC and Japan in the imports of "the rest 
of the world" (world imports less the import of the USA, 
the EC and Japan), for high growth products, medium growth 
products and low growth products. According to their 
study, which covers the period 1973-1985/1986, both the 
USA and the EC have lost market shares at home and abroad 
for both high and medium growth products in this period, 
while Japan has gained. Although the US performance is 
reported to be slightly more favourable for high growth 
products than for medium growth products, while the 
opposite was found to be true for the EC, the similarity 





Table 2. Growth in market share (per cent), EC-imports 
73-87, selected goods 
 
 
              EC 6    Europe  USA/Canada
                                                                   
                                                             
 
19 Fertilizers         -15      - 8    +42 
 
26 Office machinery      -32      -11    -32 
 
28 Semiconducters       -27      -13    -50  
 
29 Telecommunications    -36      -28    + 2 
 
30 Machinery for        -19      - 9    - 8 
   and distribution of  
   electricity 
 
31 Consumer electronics  -25      -29    -70 
 
32 Domestic electrical   -18      -14    -24 
   equipment 
 
34 Road motor vehicles  -14      - 8    -58 
 
40 Clothing         -27      -13    -40 
 
 








Definitions: See appendix 














America and Western Europe are facing the same 
competitive challenge from Japan, NIC countries and other 
industrializing countries of the third world. If 
anything, Western Europe seems to be in a somewhat better 
position than the USA in this respect, since Western 
Europe on average is doing it much better in chemicals, a   10 
sector characterized by many R&D-intensive goods. This is 
also supported by other types of evidence. Based on an 
examination of various indicators of technological 
performance, Patel and Pavitt (1987) conclude as follows: 
 
  "The evidence ... offers no justification for 
concluding that W.Europe is on the whole more 
technologically backward, or more incapable of 
turning technology to economic advantage, than the 
USA and Japan. (...) The USA, perhaps more than W. 
Europe, has seen its technological leadership 
challenged by Japan in a succession of sectors: 
steel, consumer electronics and automobiles, in the 
past; electronic components, and possibly 
telecommunication and office machinery in the 
future". (Patel and Pavitt, 1987, p. 82) 
 
Thus, the widely quoted stagnation in intra-EC trade 
during the last decades is not necessarily so alarming 
after all. What it shows is primarily that Western Europe 
- as a closely integrated production system - is wider 
than the EC. When care is taken to this fact, it turns 
out that the degree of Western European integration as 
measured through trade has continued to be on the 
increase. One possible interpretation of these 
developments is that the trade creation potentials of the 
establishment of the EC and EFTA were almost exploited by 
the early seventies, and that further trade creation 
within Western Europe from the early seventies onwards 
would have to take place through increased integration 
within a larger "European Economic Space". However, the 
changing composition of EC trade in the last decades also 
reflects increasing "World integration", between the 
developed countries of Western Europe and North America 
at the one hand, and Japan, the NICs and other 




other. While this latter process certainly represents a 
challenge to the established firms of Western Europe and 
North America, it should not necessarily be conceived as 
a threat, since it - as economic theory shows - can be 
mutually beneficial. Probably, these tendencies would 
have been even stronger had it not been for the 
protectionist trade policies followed by the EC in the 
last decades. 
 
3.  The internal market 
 
As pointed out, the expansion in intra European trade 
that took place between the EC and present day EFTA 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s was related to the free 
trade agreements of the early 1970s and the tariff 
reductions that followed. It has been shown (Ferreira, 
1990, Lundberg, 1990) that this expansion was mainly of 
the intra-industry type, consistent with the predictions 
of "modern" trade theories (based on economies of scale). 
For the trade between three Nordic EFTA countries and the 
EC between 1970 and 1984 Lundberg (1990) found that "the 
increase in intra industry trade was largest in formerly 
strongly protected sectors with fast growing markets and 
a high degree of product differentiation. The results 
support the view that differentiation in consumer demand 
and a taste for variety are dominant explanations of 
Nordic-EC trade." 
 
For present day EFTA countries the most interesting 
question related to the EC plans is whether this will 
result in a continuation of the trends from the past two 
decades or a return to the situation of the 1960s with 
competing trade blocks in Europe. Needless to say, the 
latter would put the present day EFTA countries in a 




coverage of EFTA is so much reduced compared to the 
1960s. To consider this issue it may be useful to start 
by a short discussion of the EC Commission's own view on 
the effects of the internal market. 
 
According to the Commission (Cecchini 1988, Commission 
1988)
5, the internal market will affect growth in the EC 
area in two ways. The first is a once and for all effect 
of approximately 4-6% related to direct and indirect cost 
reductions through deregulation and reducing obstacles to 
trade, increased competition and better exploitation of 
economies of scale. The second type of effects relates to 
increased innovation and diffusion of technology in the 
EC area. While considered to be important, these latter 
effects have not been quantified by the Commission. 
 
There is now an extensive literature on how realistic 
these estimates are. Some writers, as for instance Peck 
(1989), point out that compared to previous analyses of 
the economic effects of tariff reductions, the estimates 
presented by the Commission seem to be on the high side 
(".. the report overestimates the gains by a factor of 
two or three." (Peck, 1989, p. 289)). However, since the 
methodology adopted in the studies used by the Commission 
differs from that of earlier studies by taking economies 
of scale and competition effects more directly into 
account, the results are not directly comparable. Indeed, 
it may equally well be argued that the narrow theoretical 
perspective of the previous analyses of the economic 
effects of trade reductions indicates that the estimates 
presented there probably were biased downwards. 
 
                     






Other writers, such as Flam and Horn (1989), stress the 
great uncertainty attached to some of the calculations 
used by the Commission in preparing the estimates 
(calibration of theoretical simulation models). In such 
simulations, a number of assumptions have to be made, 
which may eventually turn out to be wrong. For instance, 
it has been pointed out that the estimates of economies 
of scale used in the calculations are based on rather old 
data (Melchior, 1990). Given more recent developments 
towards flexible manufacturing, these may turn out to be 
much too high. Since the results of such simulations are 
quite sensitive to the choices made, this implies that 
the results should be treated with utmost care. However, 
the Commission can hardly be said to have been especially 
careful in their use of the results of these simulation 
exercises. On the contrary, as shown by Melchior (1990), 
the Commission has chosen the version which yields 
highest growth, in spite of warnings made by the authors 
of the background study (Smith and Venables, 1988),
6 and 
then mixed these results with estimates obtained from 
other, alternative sources in a way that further 
increases the final estimates (as presented by the 
Commission).  
 
The main problems with the simulation exercise preferred 
and used by the Commission are that it is based on very 
far-reaching assumptions, and that it produces results 
that are counter-intuitive. First, it is assumed that the 
                     
6 Smith and Venables (1988) present eight different 
simulations, reflecting different assumptions of firm 
behaviour, entry/exit and market segmentation. On the 
version chosen by the Commission they point out that "it 
is question-able to what extent" this version, although 
close to the "spirit of what is meant by "completing the 
internal market"", "is a policy experiment in a meaningful 




large differences in prices on similar products that can 
be observed across EC countries today, can be explained 
by the fact that firms exploit their market power to 
charge higher prices in their domestic markets than 
elsewhere. However, the empirical evidence behind this 
assumption is weak,
7 and the possibility that these 
differences to a large extent are caused by other factors 
not taken into account cannot be ruled out. Second, it is 
assumed that the 1992 plans turn the previously segmented 
national markets into an "integrated" European market, 
where firms charge the same price for the same product in 
all markets.  However, as pointed out by several authors, 
including Smith and Venables themselves, existing market 
segmentation is only partly caused by governmental 
regulations that will be abolished by the internal 
market. Third, while one intuitively would expect that 
the reduction in non-tariff barriers and other obstacles 
to trade implied by the internal market should lead to an 
increase in trade, as in previous periods of trade 
liberalization (cf. section 2 of this paper), the 
simulation exercise preferred by the Commission actually 
predicts a strong reduction in trade both within the 
Community and between the Community and the rest of the 
world.
8  
                     
7 Norman (1989, p. 436) argues that "casual observation 
tends to confirm the (..) hypothesis for many products" 
and mentions some examples. However, he also points out 
that there is evidence that points in the opposite 
direction. In a comment, Horn (1989, p. 450) provides 
additional examples (from the car industry) of conflicting 
evidence. Thus, while it seems clear that firms charge 
different prices in different markets, it is an open 
question whether it takes the particular form assumed in 
the simulation-version preferred by the Commission. 
8 The logic is the following: in a much more competitive 
environment ("integrated" markets), prices will drop to a 
level where they are the same everywhere, and the least 





The view that the completion of the internal market 
should lead to a process of industrial concentration, 
implying among else reduced diversity in the markets, has 
been criticized by Kay(1989) and Geroski(1989). They 
point out that according to the material presented by the 
Commission, scale economics in European industry are in 
most cases rather small compared to the size of the 
market, leaving room for a relatively large number of 
firms in most industries. If there were large economies 
of scale unexploited, it is argued, these should have 
been exploited long ago, except in cases where this has 
been impossible due to protectionism and governmental 
regulations of various kinds. According to their view, 
this has been the case in a few sectors only: Aero space, 
power generating equipment (atomic energy) and 
telecommunications mainly. In these sectors, the 
deregulation implied by the internal market plans could 
lead to a process of concentration and sizeable economic 
gains. But in most industries, they argue, the increased 
competition implied by the internal market plans should 
not be expected to lead to increased concentration, but 
increased product diversity in the markets. This would 
also lead to increased welfare, but with different 
effects on firm size, location of industry and trade.  
 
From an EFTA point of view, it matters whether the 
Commission is right or whether Kay and Gerosky are right. 
According to the "integrated market" scenario endorsed by 
the Commission, the completion of the internal market 
                     
the assumption on price behaviour, the drop in prices will 
be largest for domestic producers. As a consequence, the 
share of domestic producers in the sales of each domestic 
market will increase at the expense of foreign firms. 




should be expected to lead to reduced demand for exports 
from EFTA to the EC and, consequently, reduced scope for 
exploitation of economies of scale in EFTA countries 
(since their domestic markets whether on a national or an 
EFTA scale, are small). If, on the other hand, Kay and 
Gerosky are right, the trend towards increasing intra-
industry trade within Western Europe should be expected 
to continue. However, there does not seem to be much 
evidence that can be quoted in support of the 
Commission's view. The "integrated market" scenario, 
although interesting from an academic point of view, is 
based on quite special assumptions, and does not appear 
to be especially relevant in a quantitative assessment of 
the likely effects of the completion of the internal 
market. 
 
So far we have discussed the static, short to medium run 
effects of the internal market. But as mentioned earlier, 
the Commission also argues that there exist important 
dynamic long-run effects that should be taken into 
account (Cecchini 1988, Commission 1988).
9 According to 
the Commission (1988), the possibility of higher growth 
in the long run rests on the relation between 
integration, market structure and innovation. Two 
possible routes have been considered. The first is based 
                     
9 In a recent paper Baldwin (1989) argues that there may be 
growth effects, perhaps extending to the long run, in 
excess of those taken into account by the Commission 
(through the effect of higher output on 
savings/investments and, hence, growth). His argument 
seems to carry some weight, at least in the medium run. 
But as pointed out by Venables in a comment, the argument 
rests crucially on the assumption of a constant saving 
ratio: "Changes of one or two points in this ratio could 
easily dominate the other effects discussed .. a priori 
1992 seems to me just as likely to change savingsbehaviour 
.. as to affect the capital-output ratio." (Venables, 




on the (allegedly "Schumpeterian") assumption that 
industrial concentration (fewer and larger firms) leads 
to more innovation. However, the available evidence does 
not support this view. This is also acknowledged by the 
Commission which in its own account of the economic 
effects of the internal market points out that "Most of 
the empirical studies (...) show that, apart from the 
chemical industries, large size does not favour 
innovation" (Commission 1988, p. 113).  The second 
possibility considered by the Commission is based on the 
view that the increased competition implied by the 
internal market will lead to more innovation and, hence, 
higher growth in the long run. However, it is not clear, 
theoretically or empirically, that increased competition 
necessarily leads to increased innovation. As pointed out 
already by Schumpeter, in the limiting case, "perfect 
competition", there can be no innovation since in this 
case firms have no possibility to appropriate the 
economic benefits that derive from the innovations they 
make. Thus, there is probably no easy link between market 
structure and innovation. The available evidence seems to 
suggest that an industrial structure characterized by 
diversity of firms of different sizes is the one in which 
innovations take place most frequently (Scherer 1980, Acs 
and Audretsch 1987). Whether or not the internal market 
will lead to a development in that direction is a matter 
of discussion. The chance is probably better if Kay-
Geroski are right than if the Commission is right on the 
effects of the internal market on the market structure in 
the Community. 
 
I have argued elsewhere that - apart from science push 
(which is hardly affected by market structure) - 
innovation is to a large extent a result of learning 




of technology (Fagerberg, 1990). This raises a whole set 
of new issues, since this perspective focuses on the 
quality of demand, and the prospects for new innovative 
solutions being created through the interplay between 
advanced users and producers of technology. For instance, 
to the extent that the Community would be in the 
forefront of environmental regulation, this could 
initiate new environmental technologies that, through 
learning effects, could create a competitive advantage 
for European firms in this area. Similar examples could 
be conceived in other areas as, for instance, in the 
health sector. However, this is hardly what the internal 
market is about. Rather, the principle of mutually 
recognized and market-determined standards and 
regulations should be expected to make it more difficult 
for EC governments to impose tougher and more costly 
regulations than those applied in other member states.  
Thus, to sum up, while it can not be ruled out that 
increased European integration may lead to more 
innovation, there is little so far that leads us to 
believe that this is bound to happen. 
 
4.  Small countries facing increased international 
integration: the special problem of the EFTA countries 
 
The evidence seems to suggest that the Commission's 
estimate of the effects of the internal market on 
productivity and GDP is a highly uncertain one, and 
probably errs on the high side. However, there is no 
reason to believe that the sign of the estimate is wrong. 
Large or small, the question remains: who are going to 
reap these gains? The view of the Commission seems to be 
that the reductions in costs/increases in productivity 




internal market, will accrue to Community firms only.
10 
But why should this be the case? One answer may be 
increasing protectionism vis à vis non-Community 
producers, but apparent-ly this is not what the 
Commission has in mind, and it would in any case be 
difficult to implement given the importance of the 
outside world as markets for EC firms. Rather, the 
arguments brought forward by the Commission are the 
following:   
 
  ".. the question needs to be asked as to whether 
European firms have the capacity to resist market 
entrants from non member countries who will try to 
be the first to take advantage of the large market. 
That capacity depends on the existence of strategic 
barriers to entry. The main tools for creating such 
barriers are the exploitation of the position of 
innovator and first firm on the market ("first mover 
advantage"); the use of more rapid learning 
processes, which amplify the first mover advantage; 
special relationship with customers and suppliers, 
which create durable links by increasing the cost of 
changing partner; control of a range of products, 
including substitutes etc. Thus a distinctive 
European character can be affirmed in different 
ways, reflecting a "Community preference". This 
makes European standards (information, 
compatibility, quality etc.) an essential weapon in 
the great industrial battles of today; they are keys 
opening up and controlling markets through 
technological alliances. The same is true of joint 
European research programmes which stimulate 
cooperation across boarders between Community firms 
and the research centres. Ultimately, the 
competitiveness of Europe in a completed internal 
market will be the competitiveness of its firms". 
(Commission 1988, p137-8) 
 
What is said here about "first mover advantage" and 
"customer-supplier relationship" is defendable, but there 
is nothing particular European in this, rather it is a 
                     
10 This is also, with a few qualifications, the assumption 
adopted by Norman (1989) in his analysis of the economic 




description of how internationals markets in high 
technology products function. However, there is no such 
thing as a "Community preference" on the demand side of 
the various European economies, nor could there be given 
the large cultural differences that exist between the 
countries in the Community. Industrial standards are of 
course important, but it must be remembered that although 
EC countries are important players in the European or 
international standardization associations, they - or the 
Commission for that sake - are not in the position to 
dictate standards in all areas. And even if they could, 
it would hardly do Community industry any good to have to 
adapt to industrial standards not compatible with the 
standards in the rest of the world. The consequence, one 
could imagine, would be to make Community industry less 
competitive in international markets, or the opposite of 
what is aimed for. Technological alliances are important 
in global industries today, and will probably continue to 
be so. However, there is no reason to believe that such 
alliances will be of an intra-EC kind mainly. Indeed, 
many such alliances are global, involving US, Japanese 
and European firms. There are good arguments for this, 
among else because global alliances, in addition to cost-
sharing, secure that technologies will be present in all 
important markets. This increases the chance of survival 
and reduces the risk of being left on the wrong 
technological trajectory. Joint EC research programs are 
of course important in the areas where they exist, but 
their magnitude is small compared to total R&D spending 
in the Community, and in several cases these are also 
open to non EC firms. 
 
Thus, the arguments put forward by the Commission on the 
distribution of the gains between EC and non-EC firms 




generally not convincing. If we abstract from the small 
increase in the relative costs for non-EC firms caused by 
the difference in paperwork required by EC and non-EC 
firms after the completion of the internal market, the 
opening up of hitherto protected national markets in 
individual EC countries to international competition 
should be seen as a unilateral tariff reduction by each 
individual country in favour of firms from other EC 
countries and non-EC firms. Of course, to the extent that 
foreign firms face tariffs, the advantage should be 
expected be larger for EC firms, but this is not relevant 
for firms from countries with free-trade-agreements. Many 
foreign firms also have production facilities within the 
EC and will be able to circumvent tariffs in this way. 
Furthermore, if it is true, as argued by the Commission, 
that EC firms in a number of industries - because of 
protectionism and regulations in the past - are 
relatively inefficient, foreign firms should actually be 
in a good position to outperform them. The reason is 
simple: in contrast to the EC experience, most large 
foreign firms, and certainly all foreign multinationals, 
have for decades been forced to adapt themselves to the 
much more competitive global markets, and should 
therefore be expected to have reached an efficiency-level 
superior to that of the previously protected European 
national champions. 
 
The EFTA countries are in a special position for two 
reasons: They already have free access for their 
manufacturing goods in the EC markets, and they are all 
small countries. The first should be an advantage 
compared to firms from for instance the USA, Japan or NIC 
countries, but what about the latter? It is a commonly 
held view that small countries face a comparative 




segmented and economies of scale prevail. One should 
expect, then, that the gradual reduction of obstacles to 
trade and competition implied by the internal market 
should be especially favourable for small countries 
(Krugman 1988), and this is also the view held by the 
Commission (Commission 1988, p. 21). More recently, 
however, Krugman and Venables (1990) have argued that 
small countries actually risk to lose from increased 
integration, the reason being that there always will be a 
certain degree of "natural" protection for domestic 
producers, that these will tend to be more important as 




The idea of small country disadvantages due to economies 
of scale goes back at least to Dreze (1961) and it may be 
appropriate to discuss his model here. According to 
Dreze, markets (demand) may be either international or 
national in character, the latter reflecting cases were 
product specifications are different across countries. 
The method of production may be either mass production 
(long production runs) or small scale (tailor made). Now, 
since, according to Dreze, domestic producers will always 
have an advantage in tailor made products, he 
concentrates his attention on case A and B in figure 2.
12 
below, that is the case with mass production and 
international markets (A) and the case with mass 
production and nationally segmented markets (B).  
 
                     
11 It should be noted that Krugman and Venables defines 
"smallness" in a special way, as market access. Thus, 
according to their definition, Spain is a small country, 
but Belgium is not.  
12 The figure is constructed by the author, but the goods 





Figure 2. Dreze's model (1961)     
 
                    Standardization of demand 
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Tailor-Made products 
   
                                                              
Dreze explicitly assumes that small countries can not 
"export their own tastes" (Dreze, 1961, p. 29) and that 
small countries therefore face a comparative disadvantage 
in type B goods.  From this he infers that small 
countries have to specialize in type A goods, and he 
argues that this seems to fit the Belgian  experience. 
But it is easy to find examples that contradict this 
prediction. For instance, Denmark is specialized
13 in 
furniture, Switzerland in pharmaceuticals and Sweden in 
telecommunication equipment and cars, all examples of 
type B goods. How is this to be explained?  
 
First, Dreze is probably wrong when he asserts that small 
countries can not "export their taste": the Swiss has for 
a long time exported their taste for chocolate, the 
Scandinavians their taste for furniture and so on, thus 
exploiting the demand for variety in export markets. But 
                     
13 Export specialization was measured as the market share 
for country i for commodity j in the world market divided 
by the overall market share for country i on the world 
market.  On average, this index equals unity, thus a 
country is said to be export specialized in commodity j if 
the index exceeds unity. In 1985 the numbers were: Denmark 
(furniture 5,0), Switzerland (pharmaceuticals 4.9), Sweden 
(telecommunications 2.52, road motor vehicles 1.1). 




it does not seem reasonable to explain the success of 
small countries in, say, pharmaceuticals and 
telecommunication equipment in this way. It is, however, 
possible to reconcile Dreze's basic theoretical 
perspective - if not his predictions - with these 
findings. Dreze defines economies of scale in the 
following way:  
 
  "By economies of scale, I understand not so much the 
fact that production costs are lower in large 
enterprises than in small ones, but that costs are 
typically lower for mass production than for small 
scale production."  (Dreze, 1961, p. 20)  
 
A natural interpretation of this is that the economies of 
scale - as discussed by Dreze - relate primarily to the 
size of firms, not the size of plants.
14 However, as 
pointed out by Swedenborg, economies of scale in this 
sense "is compatible with multi-plant production and with 
"foot-lose" MNCs producing in many countries" 
(Swedenborg, 1989, p. 3). Since firms from small 
countries do face a comparative disadvantage in 
industries where economies of scale at the plant level 
are important (the minimum efficient plant size very 
large), they should - following Dreze's way of reasoning 
- be expected to exploit the possibilities offered by 
economies of scale at the firm level. A brief look at the 
existing evidence does not seem to contradict this. In 
fact, according to a recent sample published by Business 
Week, of the ten most internationalized large 
manufacturing companies in the world, seven happen to be 
from EFTA countries (table 3).  
 
                     
14  This will, for instance, be the case when the most 
important sources of economies of scale relate to areas 




The main difference between the "small country 
multinationals" of table 3 and, for instance, US or 
Japanese multinationals is the degree of 
internationalization both in terms of sales and in terms 
of assets (production facilities etc.) abroad.  
Probably, these characteristics extend to many other 
firms from small countries as well. As it appears, firms 
from small countries are doing it remarkably well in 
international markets for a whole range of high 
technology products.
15 This may indicate that scale 
economies related to plant size are less important than 
commonly assumed in discussions of the likely effects of 
1992. However, this does not imply that economies of 
scale do not pose problems for governments in small 
countries. For instance, as shown by Eliasson (1988), 
manufacturing employment in small countries typically 
depends on a small number of very internationalized 
companies, and this makes these countries vulnerable to 
the performance and strategies of these companies. These 
challenges, however, are probably more related to the 
global trend towards internationalization, than to what 
happens with the EC internal market. 
  
                     
15 For an examination of small country performance in 




Table 3. The 'stateless' world of manufacturing
16 
 
Company  Home country  1989    Sales    Assets   Shares 
          Total   outside  outside  held 
          Sales   home    home  outside 
                  country  country home 
             Billions        country  
   
NESTLE  SWITZERLAND  $32.9*  98.0%   95.0%  Few 
 
SANDOZ  SWITZERLAND    8.6*  96.0    94.0  5.0% 
 
SKF    SWEDEN      4.1  96.0    90.0   20.0 
 
HOFFMANN- 
LA-ROCHE  SWITZERLAND    6.7*  96.0    60.0  0.0 
 
PHILIPS  NETHERLANDS   30.0  94.0    85.0*  46.0 
 
SMITHKLINE 
BEECHAM  BRITAIN      7.0  89.0    75.0  46.0 
 
ABB    SWEDEN     20.6  85.0*    NA  50.0 
 
ELECTROLUX SWEDEN     13.8  83.0    80.0  20.0 
 
VOLVO  SWEDEN     14.8  80.0    30.0  10.0 
 
ICI    BRITAIN     22.1  78.0    50.0  16.0 
 
MICHELIN  FRANCE      9.4  78.0     NA   0.0 
 
HOECHST  W. GERMANY   27.3  77.0     NA  42.0 
 
UNILEVER  BRITAIN/NETH.  35.3  75.0*   70.0*  27.0 
AIR  
LIQUIDE  FRANCE      5.0  70.0    66.0   6.0 
 
CANON  JAPAN      9.4  69.0    32.0  14.0 
NORTHERN 
TELECOM  CANADA      6.1  67.1    70.5  16.0 
 
SONY   JAPAN     16.3  66.0     NA  13.6 
 
BAYER  W. GERMANY   25.8  65.4     NA    48.0 
                     
16  This is a sampling of manufacturing companies with a 
minimum $3 billion in annual sales that derive at least 
40% of those sales from countries other than their home 
country. It does not include state-owned companies or 
holding companies. Taken from Business Week, May 14 1990. 





BASF   W. GERMANY   13.3  65.0     NA   NA 
 
GILETTE  US        3.8  65.0    63.0  10.0* 
 
 
Thus, on the assumption that increasing direct 
protectionism is less likely, non-EC firms have few 
reasons to fear the internal market. To the extent that 
it is true that EC markets have been highly protected, 
foreign firms may even be in a better position than EC 
firms to take part in the coming competition. This is 
especially so in the case of firms from the EFTA 
countries. Since their home markets have been small, EFTA 
firms have had to rely much more on foreign markets than 
many EC firms, and should therefore be expected to be in 
a good shape to face the increasing competition implied 
by the internal market. Compared to their competitors 
from the USA, Japan and the NICs, they also enjoy a zero 
tariff for manufactured goods, a situation that is likely 
to continue.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to discuss possible 
consequences of the EC internal market for EFTA countries 
(and firms). The conclusion may be summarized in three 
points. 
 
a)  While it may be analytically convenient to discuss 
consequences for EFTA countries of the internal 
market in two polar cases, either included or not, 
this is not valid as a description of the challenges 
facing EFTA firms today. As shown in section 2, and 
also in many other studies, EC and EFTA are already 




between membership and non-membership almost 
artificial, at least as far as manufacturing 
industry is concerned. 
 
b)  The economic consequences of the internal market in 
terms of growth and productivity are difficult to 
assess. As pointed out by Kay "1992 is perhaps the 
most successful marketing campaign of the 
decade"(Kay, 1989, p. 28). The estimates presented 
by the Commission are built on assumptions that 
cannot be easily defended, and probably err on the 
high side. However, there are few reasons to believe 
that the competitive position of EFTA firms on the 
EC market will deteriorate following the completion 
of the internal market. Because of their small 
domestic markets, most EFTA firms have already been 
exposed to international competition for a long 
time, and should therefore be in a good position to 
exploit the possibilities offered by current 
deregulation efforts and opening up of previously 
protected markets in Community member countries. 
 
c)  EFTA countries already practice free trade to a 
larger extent than the EC countries (Lundberg 1989) 
and it is possible that they therefore have less to 
gain in terms of increased economic welfare from 
liberalization of imports than many EC countries 
have. If the EFTA countries join in with the EC in 
their efforts to deregulate and open previously 
protected markets, as they probably will have to 
(and also are inclined to) do, the effects will 
probably be most marked outside manufacturing (in 
the financial sector, for instance). 




In section 2 it was pointed out that European integration 
from the early 1960s onwards can be divided in two 
phases, both characterized by important trade creation 
effects: (1) Integration within EC and EFTA and (2) 
Integration between the initial EC and the initial EFTA. 
It is difficult to end this paper without pointing to 
what probably will be the major development in this area 
in the next decades: integration between present day 
Western Europe and present day Eastern Europe, the 
economic effects of which may far exceed those of the 
internal market plans. This is, however, a topic which 
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Table A1.  Shares of EC imports, 1961-1987, Products based on 
natural resources (excl oil and gas) 
                    Change 
                                                                  
        1961   1973   1987    61-73   73-87 
                                                                  
 
(1) EC 6      24.42  39.53  45.57  +15.11   +6.04 
 
(2) EC 3       6.55   6.22   8.48   -0.33   +2.26 
 
Sum (1-2) EC 9   30.97  45.75  54.05  +14.78   +8.30 
 
(3) EFTA 6      9.98   9.30  11.65   -0.68   +2.35 
 
(4) South-Europe   3.03   3.56   5.32   +0.53   +1.76 
 
Sum (1-4) Europe  43.98  58.61  71.02  +14.63  +12.41 
 
(5) Japan       0.73   0.93   0.76   +0.20   -0.17 
 
(6) NIC       2.53   3.96   3.74   +1.43   -0.22 
 
(7) USA + Canada  14.42  10.55   6.73   -3.87   -3.82 
 
(8)Rest of world  39.34  25.95  17.75  -12.39   -8.20 
 




Table A2.  Shares of EC imports, Chemicals. 
                             Change                                               
                                                                  
        1961   1973   1987    61-73   73-87 
                                                                  
 
(1) EC 6      46.03  62.70  59.69  +16.67   -3.01 
 
(2) EC 3       8.73   7.84  11.01   -0.89   +3.17 
 
Sum (1-2) EC 9   54.76  70.54  70.70  +15.78   +0.16 
 
(3) EFTA 6     10.95   8.69   9.86   -2.26   +1.17 
 
(4) South-Europe   1.24   1.28   2.03    0.04   +0.75 
 
Sum (1-4) Europe  66.95  80.51  82.59  +13.56   +2.08 
 
(5) Japan       0.85   1.69   1.90   +0.84   +0.21 
 





(7) USA + Canada  23.21  11.98   8.26  -11.23   -3.72 
 
(8)Rest of World   8.00   5.05   6.14   -2.95   +1.09 
 
Sum (1-8)        100      100    100 
 
 
Table A3.  Shares of EC imports, Machinery and transport 
equipment                               
                    Change                                              
                                                                  
        1961   1973   1987    61-73   73-87 
                                                                  
 
(1) EC 6      50.76  58.77  49.63   +8.01   -9.14 
 
(2) EC 3      13.09   8.35   8.54   -4.74   +0.19 
 
Sum (1-2) EC 9   63.85  67.12  58.17   +3.27   -8.95 
 
(3) EFTA 6     11.46   9.70   9.21   -1.76   -0.49 
 
(4) South-Europe   0.19   1.17   3.15   +0.98   +1.98 
 
Sum (1-4) Europe  75.50  77.99  70.53   +2.49   -7.46 
 
(5) Japan       0.60   4.84  11.15   +4.24   +6.31 
 
(6) NIC       0.20   1.28   4.19   +1.08   +2.91 
 
(7) USA + Canada  21.44  13.82  11.36   -7.62   -2.46 
 
(8)Rest of World   2.26   2.07   2.77   -0.19   +0.70 
 
Sum (1-8)       100    100    100 
 
 
Table A4.  Shares of EC imports, Traditional industral 
products                        Change                            
                                                                  
        1961   1973   1987    61-73  73-87 
                                                                  
 
(1) EC 6      55.20  56.47  45.42   +1.27  -11.05 
 
(2) EC 3      11.36   7.22   7.89   -4.14   +0.67 
 
Sum (1-2) EC 9   66.56  63.69  53.31   -2.87  -10.38 
 





(4) South-Europe   1.16   3.38   6.72   +2.22   +3.34 
 
Sum (1-4) Europe  79.51  75.88  69.11   -3.63   -6.77 
 
(5) Japan       1.88   2.21   2.39   +0.33   +0.18 
 
(6) NIC       5.01   9.02  11.36   +4.01   +2.34 
 
(7) USA + Canada   8.77   5.74   5.18   -3.03   -0.56 
 
(8)Rest of world   4.83   7.15  11.96   +2.32   +4.81 
 
Sum (1-8)       100    100    100 
   
 
 